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ABSTRACT 
Through a consideration of policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this article 
examines the autonomy and effectiveness of the EU as an actor. We discuss first the criteria 
by which autonomy and effectiveness can be judged and then consider these by reference to 
EU policy since the formation of the Quartet in 2002. We argue that the EU has been 
effective in articulating a consistent and clear set of policies on Israel-Palestine. While this 
has placed it on-side with US-led initiatives to foster a solution to the conflict, we regard 
such an alignment as consistent with EU autonomy. These findings allow us to make 
qualified but still positive comments on the emerging EU Global Strategy.  The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict certainly demonstrates the limitations of EU external action but in 
affirming its credentials as an autonomous partner of the US, the EU is less ineffectual than 
some commentators claim.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The preparation of an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy has provided a fillip 
to debates on the purpose and execution of European external action.1  A multitude of 
issues has figured in this debate, but two in particular – EU effectiveness and autonomy - 
are noteworthy given that both have framed the discussion of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) since its inception.  Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has suggested that the EU needs to follow 
its own priorities, and be more ‘adaptive, more innovative, and more proactive.’2 This is a 
view also voiced in much expert commentary. Autonomy, Damien Helly has noted, remains 
‘the missing ingredient in a European strategic renaissance.’3  
                                                          
 
* Lecturer in International Relations, School of Government, Plymouth University.  
** Professor of International Politics and Head of the School of Government and Society, University of 
Birmingham 
We would like to thank Robert Dover, Andrea Locatelli, Anna Bull and Daniel Ellis for their comments on 
previous versions of this article.  
 
 
1
 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy (June 2016) at: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review 
_web.pdf   
2
  The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World 20 
(presented by High Representative Mogherini, June 2015) at:  https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/strategic-
review-european-union-changing-global-environment 
3
 Growing Pains? The Long Teenage Years of European Strategy, ECDPM Talking Points blog  8 January 2016, at: 
http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/challenges-2016-blog-eu-global-strategy/ 
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 Israel-Palestine (I-P) is, in this connection, an instructive case. Much, of course, has 
been written on the EU’s role here, not all of it complimentary. Recent studies have 
acknowledged the EU’s distinctive contribution,4 but this has to be set against the view that 
EU external action is largely incapable of having tangible effect.5 The implied link here 
between actorness (or autonomy) and effectiveness is another well-trodden path of EU 
studies.6  Interest in this subject has recently been revived,7 the reasons for which have 
been aptly captured by Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton. In their view, the EU is ‘at a 
crossroads.’ On the one hand, there have been notable institutional and treaty changes that 
have raised both the profile and authority of the EU in external relations. Yet, on the other, 
EU effectiveness has been circumscribed by cumbersome procedures, internal division and 
the lingering shadow of American international leadership.8 Despite heightened 
expectations, therefore, the EU has, for some, continued to ‘punch below its weight.’9 The 
                                                          
4
 D. Bouris, The European Union and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: State-Building without a State 
(Routledge, 2014); A. Persson, The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1971-2013 (Lexington Books, 2013). 
5
 E.B. Aymat, European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 124 Chaillot Paper (European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, 2010); R. Miller, The Business of Politics, the Politics of Business: Turning EU Economic 
Power into Political Influence in The Middle East Conflict in Europe and the Middle East: the Hour of the EU? (B. 
Wassenberg and G. Faleg eds. Peter Lang, 2012).  
6
 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor 2
nd
 edition (Routledge, 2006). 
7
 G. Edwards, The EU’s Foreign Policy and the Search for Effect, 27(3) Intl. Rels. 276-291 (2013); K. McDonagh, 
Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk? Understanding the EU’s Security Identity, 53(3) J. Cmn. Mkt. St. 627-641 
(2015).  
8 A. Niemann and C. Bretherton, EU External Policy at the Crossroads: the Challenge of Actorness and 
Effectiveness, 27(3) Int. Rels. 261-275 at 262 (2013).  
9
 D.C. Thomas, Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy, 
50(3), J. Cmn. Mkt. St. 457-474 (2012). 
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EU Global Strategy must be seen in this context, as another attempt to promote the EU’s 
place in the world. That it sets out to do so in an atmosphere of despair occasioned by the 
European migration crisis, civil war in Syria, a broken relationship with Russia and ‘wicked 
problems’ such as climate change makes the task necessary but seemingly that much more 
difficult.10   
 By revisiting the EU’s role in relation to I-P, we depart from such pessimism, 
articulating a qualified but still positive assessment of European external action. Taking the 
formation of the Quartet for Peace in 2002 as our point of departure, we show that in the 
period up until mid-2016 the EU has moved toward autonomy and effectiveness. The EU has 
been able to take advantage of the various opportunities it has had on the I-P conflict and 
has been able to stake out, on occasion, a position distinct from that of the US. This has 
meant neither that the EU has usurped US leadership nor that it has brought the I-P issue to 
a resolution. Its record does, however, suggest that EU external policy (and CFSP specifically) 
can in certain circumstances be more consequential than its gainsayers would believe11 and 
so gives point to the argument that a Global Strategy for the EU is far from a lost cause. 
Before providing detail in this regard, we turn first to a brief discussion of autonomy and 
effectiveness, the criteria by which we will judge EU action.   
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 These factors and others are all considered in The European Union in a Changing Global Environment, supra 
n.2. 
11
 J. Howorth and A. Menon, Wake Up Europe!, 1(1) Global Affairs.  11-20 (2015). 
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II. CONCEPTS 
1. EU autonomy 
Autonomy is essential to actorness. The latter’s properties of authority, cohesiveness and 
recognition by others only make sense if autonomy is assumed a priori.12 Autonomy has 
more than one connotation in the EU context. In the first place, it exists internally, being a 
function of how the EU relates to its Member States. This relationship, between an 
organization and its principals, is a mainstay of organizational studies. In the case of the EU, 
as Randall Stone notes, ‘states have delegated substantial authority […] in areas where they 
have broadly congruent interests.’13 It is the extent of this delegation that represents the 
EU’s unique qualities. The Lisbon Treaty’s allocation to the EU of areas of exclusive and 
shared competence (coupled with the granting of full legal personality to the Union) is 
without equal in global and regional governance. Logically-speaking, actor autonomy is most 
assured where, in keeping with Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), these competences are exercised.  Thus, on trade (an exclusive 
competence) the Commission negotiates directly on behalf of the EU (albeit subject to a 
mandate from the European Council). On global climate change (a shared competence), 
meanwhile, the EU is, along with the individual Member States, a party to both the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Coordinating EU and joint Member States’ 
positions in this regard has been done through the combined efforts of the Commission, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), and the Council. 
                                                          
12
 E. da Conceiçã-Heldt and S. Meunier, Speaking with a Single Voice: the EU as an Effective Actor in Global 
Governance, 21(7), J. Euro.Pub.Pol. 961-979 (2014).  
13
 R.W. Stone, Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy  29 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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 But what does such an understanding of autonomy mean for CFSP specifically? Here, 
the Lisbon Treaty has meant little change to a policy sphere already tightly controlled by the 
Member States. Both the High Representative and the EEAS can call upon institutional 
resources but their impact is reliant ultimately on the readiness of the Member States to 
follow and support. The High Representative thus acts to greatest effect where a European 
consensus pertains. On the Iran dossier, for instance, Catherine Ashton was able to play a 
prominent role in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. Mogherini continued these 
efforts and so the EU obtained a formal role in the E3+3 (the EU, France, Germany, the UK, 
Russia, China and the US) agreement with Iran in July 2015. Thereafter, the ending of 
financial sanctions provided the High Representative with the opportunity to lead a high-
level dialogue on economic cooperation with Iran. While implementation of the deal with 
Iran is by no means certain, the case does testify to the EU’s ability to develop a common 
foreign policy approach, one that addresses a major international challenge in concert with 
other actors. Equally, on I-P, where the two-state solution is among the most consistently 
held of EU foreign policy objectives, the High Representative has for many years acted on 
behalf of the EU on the Quartet. By contrast, where the Member States are fundamentally 
divided – on Syria for instance - the High Representative has been a largely marginal figure.  
 Such dependency on Member State positions has led Franco Algieri to describe the 
EU as ‘a nonautonomous actor.’14 This is a critical observation when considering how policy 
is made, but somewhat less important when considering what policy is made - the outputs 
of the EU, in other words, rather than its inputs. Such ‘black-boxing’ is a step removed from 
the reality of how the EU arrives (or fails to arrive) at a particular position. However, while 
                                                          
14
 F. Algieri, In Search of Shared Autonomy: the EU as a Restricted Foreign, Security and Defence Political Actor 
in European Autonomy in Space 93 (ed C. Al-Ekabi, Springer, 2015).  
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we accept that the EU is not a unitary actor in policy formulation, we can, for the sake of 
analytical convenience still regard it ‘as a single intervening actor’ in policy articulation.15 
Not do so would leave one at an analytical dead end – we cannot make judgments on EU 
policy if we assume away its status as an agent.  
 In making that assumption, we are moving to the second way in which autonomy 
can be understood. Here, it is something that exists externally, a relational property 
considered by reference to other actors. The Treaties of European Union have not only 
empowered the EU to pursue CFSP (and its offspring, the Common Security and Defence 
Policy [CSDP]) but have done so in a way that presupposes the EU will act distinctively and 
purposively. The EU in this domain is thus possessed of policies and strategies (including 
both the 2016 Global Strategy and its precursor the 2003 European Security Strategy), 
institutional assets, and an identifiable discourse of security and order, giving rise, in turn, to 
a unique set of epithets – ‘civilian’, ‘normative power’ and so on – which scholars have used 
to describe its role in the world.16 The EU can thus claim an ability to articulate European 
interests, ‘promoting’ according to Sven Biscop, ‘respect for the universal values that 
underpin [the European] model in the rest of the world.’ Equally, it can claim ‘a specific way 
of doing foreign policy’ - one which, to paraphrase the European Security Strategy, is 
                                                          
15
 A. Kartsonaki and S. Wolff, The EU’s Responses to Conflicts in its Wider Neighbourhood: Human or European 
Security?, 29(2) Global Soc., 199-226  at 201, fn.7 (2015).   
16  I.Manners, Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics, 48(1) J. Cmn. Mkt. St. 67-87 
(2012); A.J.K. Shepherd,  The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider, 
29(2) Global Soc. 156-174 (2015).  
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preventative, multilateral and comprehensive.17  
 If external autonomy presumes taking action in contradistinction to that of others, in 
the case of the I-P conflict and the wider Middle East region, the US has necessarily been the 
main point of reference.18 Politically-speaking, such an articulation may be problematic - the 
US, is after all, an ally of most European states in a formal sense through NATO. However, 
difference is a desirable state of affairs not because European and American aims may be at 
odds but because, in a broad historical context, European integration has been premised on 
correcting the imbalance in the transatlantic relationship that has favoured the US. And this 
has a particular relevance in the context of the I-P conflict. As Christopher Hill has 
suggested, when the European Community (EC) entered the Middle East peace process in 
the early 1970s it did so with a promise to provide ‘an alternative view to that of the United 
States, both within the Western world and on behalf of it.’19 There has ever since been a 
creative tension in the EC/EU-US relationship over Middle East issues. The EU has, most 
notably, been out in front in supporting the Palestinian claim to statehood.20 Further, even 
when European and American views are in agreement one cannot simply assume that this is 
a consequence of European deference. A coincidence of views could be precisely that - a 
coincidence, based on shared assumptions. Equally, it might reflect the obligations of 
                                                          
17
 S. Biscop, Peace without Money, War without Americans: Challenges for European Strategy, 89(5), Intnl. Affs.  
1125-1142 at 1127 (2013).   
18
 D. Möckli and V. Mauer eds. Euro-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq (Routledge, 
2011).  
19
 C. Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, 31(1)  J. Cmn. Mkt. 
St. 305-328 at 311 (1993).  
20
 D. Bouris, The European Union and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: State-building without a State 
(Routledge, 2014).  
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partnership, a point of some consequence given the EU’s involvement in the Quartet. In 
both cases, some agency would need to be accorded to the EU.   
 
2. EU effectiveness  
Ineffectiveness has long been the bête noir of EU foreign policy. Critics of its international 
role have charged the EU with being poor at aggregating the preferences of its Member 
States, feeble in projecting collective European influence, and incapable of taking swift, 
necessary and decisive action.21 The strength of this criticism lies, in part, in the all too 
evident contrast between the ambition of EU action and the achievement of results. 
Christopher Hill’s well-known notion of the ‘capabilities-expectations gap,’22 is relevant here 
as is the problem of internal disagreement, or the so-called ‘consensus-expectations gap.’23 
That, in turn, has been paralleled by concern at the overly complex nature of policy-making 
post-Lisbon as well as the reluctance among the Member States to exploit policy 
instruments to the full, distracted as they have been by the internal challenges of European 
integration, not least the Eurozone crisis.24     
 Yet, as Christopher Bickerton has pointed out, a good deal of commentary 
bemoaning the EU’s lacklustre performance starts from ‘a crypto-normative attachment’ to 
                                                          
21
 A. Menon, The JCMS Annual Review Lecture. Divided and Declining? Europe in a Changing World,  52(S1) J. 
Cmn. Mkt. St. 5-24 (2014).  
22
 Hill, supra n.19.  
23
 A. Toje, The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy, 39(1) Sec. Dial. 121-
141 (2014). 
24
 S. Vanhoonacker and K. Pomorska, EU Diplomacy Post-Lisbon: the Legacy of the Ashton Era in The Diplomatic 
System of the European Union: Evolution, Change and Challenges (eds. M. Smith, S. Keukeleire and S. 
Vanhoonacker, Routledge, 2016).  
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comparing it with national foreign policies.25 Here, effectiveness is judged, even by those 
sympathetic to European foreign policy, by how well the EU has performed when set against 
the actions of great powers, most obviously the US, but also on occasion China, India and 
Russia.26 This comparison makes sense in those cases - trade and environment policy – 
where the EU operates as an authoritative state-like actor. In the case of CFSP, however, the 
picture is very different given the constraints already noted. A view of effectiveness, 
however, can still be arrived at. If, ‘external’ autonomy is related to difference, then to 
extend an earlier point, effectiveness can be regarded as the ability of the EU to articulate 
positions that are distinguishable from other actors in a policy domain. On that basis, one 
would be interested in how far policy actors have accepted the right of the EU to take a 
position, how far those actors have recognized the EU position as worthy of consideration, 
and how far, finally, those same actors have accepted (and, by extension, adopted) it.  
 Evidence is still needed as to the outcome the EU has sought to influence. 
Effectiveness is, in other words, about objectives.27 In this connection, a maximalist 
definition would consider how far a given objective has been realized; a minimalist one 
would pay regard to the ability of an actor to set and articulate that objective; and a median 
definition would look at the manner in which the objectives had been pursued. In what 
follows, we are concerned with the second and third of these. The first, is very demanding 
                                                          
25
 C.J. Bickerton, European Union Foreign Policy: from Effectiveness to Functionality 8 (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011). 
26
 S. Biscop, The Winter of our Discontent? Europe and the Arab Spring, paper presented at the UACES Annual 
Conference, Leeds, 1-4 September 2013, http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1301/biscop.pdf  
27
 D.C. Thomas, Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy,  
50(3) J. Cmn. Mkt. St.  457-474 at 460 (2012). 
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methodologically (having to contend with myriad problems of causation), but is sidelined 
here simply on grounds of pragmatism; the I-P conflict has proven resistant to resolution for 
reasons that go well beyond the ability of the EU to influence an outcome. Certainly within 
the framework of the Roadmap for Peace, the best efforts of the US as much as the EU, 
Turkey, Egypt and other interested parties, have not translated into a lasting settlement.  
 
III. PRACTICE 
1. The two-state solution and the Roadmap for Peace 
The EU, Sven Biscop has suggested, has been ‘instrumental in the world-wide acceptance of 
[…] Palestinian claims as legitimate demands.’28 The ‘rights of the Palestinians’ were raised 
as early as the Brussels Declaration of 1973; support for the right to Palestinian self-
determination followed in the Venice Declaration of 1980 and in the 1999 Berlin Declaration 
the EU lent its support to ‘the option’ of a Palestinian state.29 Sympathy for the Palestinian 
cause was balanced by an unequivocal acceptance of Israel’s rights to statehood and to live 
in peace with its neighbours. Nonetheless, the European stance was a significant assertion 
of diplomatic leadership as the EU staked out a position that ‘went ahead of other 
international players, including the US.’30 
 By the time the Quartet was established, the EU was thus already possessed of a 
vision of how to deal with the Israel-Palestine conundrum. That vision was reaffirmed in the 
                                                          
28
 S. Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security 65 (Ashgate, 2003). 
29
 Unless otherwise cited, EU positions on I-P are collected at the site of the European External Action Service, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/about/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm  
30
 P. Mueller, Europe’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East Peace Process: the Construction of EU Actorness in 
Conflict Resolution, 14(1) Persp. Euro. Pols. and Soc. 20-35 at 27 (2013).  
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Seville Declaration of June 2002 which called for ‘the early establishment’ of a ‘sovereign 
State of Palestine’, an end to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, a ‘fair solution 
[...] to the complex issue of Jerusalem’, and a ‘just, viable and agreed solution to the 
problem of the Palestinian refugees.’  The end result ‘should be two states living side by side 
within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours.’  To 
that end, the EU was committed to working ‘with its partners in the international 
community, especially with the United States in the framework of the Quartet.’31  
 The US, for its part, showed unprecedented agreement with the two-state solution. 
As George W. Bush later reflected, he was ‘the first [American] President to publicly call for 
a Palestinian state.’32 That call came in the Rose Garden speech of June 2002. Bush had 
already asserted in his appearance before the UN General Assembly in November 2001 that 
the US was ‘working for the day when two states – Israel and Palestine – [could] live 
peacefully together.’33 The Rose Garden speech reaffirmed this ‘vision [of] two states, living 
side by side in peace and security’, but to appease doubters within his Administration, Bush 
accompanied it with a call for Palestinians ‘to elect new leaders […] not compromised by 
terror’ (a clear indication that a resolution of the I-P conflict required the removal of Yasser 
Arafat from office). Such linkage was not EU policy, however. Indicative of its autonomy 
from the US, throughout 2002 the High Representative Javier Solana, acting on behalf of the 
                                                          
31
 Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions (21 and 22 June 2002), Annex VI at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf-1993-2003/presidency-conclusions_seville-
european-council_-21-and-22-june-2002/+&cd=2&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=uk  
32
 G.W. Bush, Decision Points 404 (Virgin Books, 2010). 
33
 G.W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly (10 November 2001), at: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110- 
3.html  
13 
 
13 
 
EU in the Quartet, made concerted efforts to keep open lines of communication with the 
Palestinian leader.    
 While US policy was careful to give the impression of leadership, Washington was 
still reliant on partners to effect change. It was for this reason that the Bush Administration 
conceded to the formation of the Quartet (embracing representatives of the US, the EU, the 
UN and Russia). That body’s first and most important statement, the Roadmap for Peace 
(issued in April 2003), was heralded as a breakthrough but met with immediate problems.  
The Roadmap was comprised of three phases. Phase I (from inception to May 2003) foresaw 
an end to Palestinian violence, followed by Palestinian political reform, Israeli withdrawal 
from Palestinian cities and a freeze on Israeli settlement expansion.  Phase II (June 2003 – 
December 2003) would start after Palestinian elections and end ‘with the possible creation 
of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.’  Phase III (as early as 2004/2005) would, 
finally, bring about the consolidation of a Palestinian state, and ‘Arab acceptance of normal 
relations with Israel.’34 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s first reaction to this initiative 
was entirely hostile, claiming it was a ‘document of surrender’ that would lead to ‘Israel’s 
destruction.’35  The Palestinian Authority (PA), for its part, accepted the Roadmap but more 
militant Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not.  
 Despite this impasse, the Roadmap held a broader international significance. Bush in 
comments in March 2003 noted that the document was the product of ‘close cooperation’ 
                                                          
34
 Roadmap for Peace, at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf  
35
 Cited in Y. Meital, Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East 106 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006).  
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between the US and the other members of the Quartet.36 As such, that meant an alteration 
of the US approach. Previous interventions in the Arab-Israeli dispute (under Presidents 
Carter and Clinton) had sought to exclude the UN and the Russians, while paying only lip-
service to European acquiescence. The Roadmap, by contrast, entailed the active 
involvement of other parties both in framing an agreement and overseeing its 
implementation. In that light, it was not surprising that Russia took advantage of the 
opportunity to become involved in the Quartet. Moscow had a lingering influence in the 
region plus diplomatic muscle given its permanent status on the Security Council. That the 
EU (rather than say, the UK or France, two other permanent members of the Security 
Council) was included was more significant. It was an acknowledgement that the EU had 
come to encapsulate the European position on I-P, that it (rather than individual Member 
States) had some diplomatic traction over the Palestinian side, and that EU assistance to the 
Palestinians would be material in seeing through the provisions of the Roadmap. The EU had 
very little influence over the Israeli government, and Tel Aviv for its part barely concealed its 
distaste for European involvement. However, as the Roadmap was taking shape the EU 
made clear where it could have an effect. The European Council meeting of December 2002 
noted that ‘with the aim of supporting the reforms in the Palestinian territories, the EU 
[would] continue its budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority with clear objectives 
and conditions.’37 With financial support of the Palestinian Authority standing at some 10 
                                                          
36
 President Discusses Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East (14 March 2003) at:  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030314-4.html 
37
 Seville European Council,  supra n.31.  
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million Euros per month at that point, Richard Youngs summarized the EU’s position thus: 
‘we help build the Palestinian state first, then we aim to perfect democracy.’38   
 
2. The security wall and Sharon’s disengagement plan 
No sooner had it been launched than progress on the Roadmap was blocked by the vexed 
issue of the Israeli security wall. The wall’s first section was completed in July 2003. When 
fully erected it was expected to largely follow the 1949 Israel-Jordan armistice line, although 
some sections would penetrate the West Bank. The initiative was fiercely defended by the 
Israeli government as a legitimate response to Palestinian terrorism,39 yet international 
opinion was largely hostile. Condemnation of the wall provided an opportunity for the EU to 
assert a clear position on the I-P conflict. The Council (External Relations) at its meeting of 
May 2003 noted that ‘the so-called security fence’ threatened ‘to render the two-state 
solution physically impossible.’40 The European Council the following month called upon 
Israel to end the wall’s construction.41 Initially, the US too was critical of the Israeli 
position,42 but the Bush administration continued to steer to the view that Palestinian 
terrorism constituted the main obstacle to peace. This difference of emphasis with the EU 
sharpened as the security wall and related issues garnered wider international attention.  
                                                          
38
 R. Youngs, Europe and the Middle East in the Shadow of September 11 162 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
39
 Israeli Foreign Ministry, Summary of Israel’s Response Regarding the Security Fence (28 February 2005), at: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fencereply.html 
40
 European Council, Declaration on the Middle East, Brussels (29 January 2003) at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf  
41
 Thessaloniki European Council, Presidency Conclusions (19-20 June 2003), para.86 at:  
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf-1993-2003/presidency-conclusions 
42
 D. Stout, Israel to Continue Building Security Fence Criticized by Bush, New York Times (29 July 2003). 
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 In February 2004, Sharon claimed, ‘this [security] vacuum for which the Palestinians 
are to blame, cannot go on forever’ and so announced a ‘disengagement plan’ involving the 
evacuation of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and Samaria in the West Bank.43 
Coincidently, Bush was running for re-election and believed that backing Sharon’s plan 
would help him find a common cause with Jewish voters and pro-Israel Christian 
conservatives in battleground states such as Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania.44 By contrast, 
the EU’s reaction to Sharon’s initiative looked more balanced. As Stephen Everts pointed 
out, ‘European governments were quick to welcome any withdrawal from occupied 
territory; but they were deeply critical of the other elements of the Bush-Sharon deal.’45  
 In fact, by this point the US was already isolated. In October 2003 it had vetoed a 
draft Security Council resolution condemning the security wall. A similar resolution 
sponsored by the EU caucus was then put before the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) and passed by 144 votes to 4 (the US, along with Israel, Micronesia and the Marshall 
Islands voted against). A further UNGA resolution of December referred the matter to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, in turn, issued an advisory opinion that ‘the 
construction of the wall constitutes action not in conformity with various legal obligations 
incumbent upon Israel.’46 The UNGA then voted by 150 to 6 (the US again being one of the 
few dissenters) demanding that Israel heed the ICJ’s opinion. On this occasion, the US 
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delegate insisted that ‘Bush’s vision of two states’ premised on the Roadmap still remained 
the most credible route to peace. The Dutch delegate speaking on behalf of the EU caucus, 
concurred that the Roadmap ‘remained the basis for a peaceful settlement’ and further that 
Israel had a right to self-defence, but made clear that the route of the security fence 
remained unacceptable.47   
 For all these differences, the American and EU positions still offered some hope of 
convergence – both sides remained committed to the Roadmap as well as the Quartet (even 
if, in light of the war in Iraq, Washington’s Middle East efforts were directed elsewhere), and 
the EU had seemingly tempered its opposition to the security wall - regarding its route, 
rather than the construct as such, as the problem.  Yet the EU had clearly staked out a 
distinctive role. It would do so again in 2005 with the launch of two missions in Palestinian 
territory under the auspices of CSDP:  EUBAM Rafah on the border between the Gaza Strip 
and Egypt, and EUPOL COPPS deployed following a Palestinian request for help with the PA’s 
policing and law enforcement function.  
 
3. The boycott of Hamas 
Following elections to the Palestine Legislative Council in 2006, open conflict erupted 
between the two main wings of Palestinian politics. Hamas assumed control of the Gaza 
Strip while its rival, Fatah, obtained ascendancy in the West Bank. Two rival Palestinian 
governments arose in consequence, although it was the Fatah-led administration of 
President Mamoud Abbas in Ramallah which came to be regarded internationally as the 
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more legitimate. Hamas, despite its electoral showing (the Change and Reform bloc, which it 
led, had won a majority of seats), continued to be ostracized.  
 With the assent of the EU, the Quartet suspended aid to the Palestinians. The 
Quartet made its resumption contingent upon a renunciation of violence, recognition of 
Israel and acceptance of previous agreements on I-P including the Roadmap. In the case of 
Hamas, this was a policy designed to fail and ensured that the lion’s share of aid to the 
Palestinians – both from the US and the EU - would favour the government in Ramallah. 
Indeed, EU aid to the PA actually increased between 2006 and 2008, such that the EU and its 
Member States retained the record of the first half of the 2000s as the largest donors of 
Overseas Development Assistance to the Palestinians.48 Broader ties between the EU and 
the PA resumed in June 2007 following the collapse of the Palestinian unity government 
(which had included Hamas) and work on the EU-Palestinian Territory Action Plan agreed in 
May 2005 recommenced in 2008.   
 An important cornerstone of EU policy - institution building and support of the PA – 
had been challenged by the Hamas episode. But siding with the US in a boycott was not, as 
some have claimed, simply a consequence of American pressure. 49 The EU had labelled 
Hamas a proscribed terrorist organization in 2001 and European governments had long 
regarded it as an unwelcome rival of Fatah. The downside of such a stance was that the EU 
enjoyed no credibility with Hamas itself and so was unable to mediate in the intra-
Palestinian dispute. Had it offered a diplomatic olive branch to Hamas then the EU would 
have assumed a distinctive position on the I-P conflict. The diplomatic costs of doing so 
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were, however, too high.  Rapport with Hamas would have scuppered EU-Israeli dialogue, 
harmed relations with those Arab countries (not least Saudi Arabia) which opposed the 
organization, irreparably divided the Quartet, and compromised the EU’s support of US-
sponsored talks on the I-P premised as these were on a bilateral understanding between 
Israel and the government in Ramallah. While there was some support for dialogue with 
Hamas in the European Parliament, among the Member States opinion was almost 
uniformly hostile.50 The assumption here was that Hamas was diplomatically toxic and 
keeping it at arms’ length was essential if the EU was to retain its credibility among the I-P 
conflict’s main players.  
 
4. The Annapolis Process  
The benefits of the EU’s stance were only partly in evidence as the peace process resumed 
with the Annapolis Conference on the Middle East in November 2007. Ostensibly geared to 
kick-starting the Roadmap, this event was only made possible by American efforts - 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had met several times with the Israeli and PA 
leaderships in the course of the year, resulting in a Joint Understanding by which the two 
sides agreed to work towards a resolution of their differences. While Solana had prior to the 
conference undertaken his own diplomatic mission to Israel, the PA and Egypt, the role of 
the EU in laying the diplomatic ground was marginal. Further, when the Annapolis 
conference convened, the main route of EU participation, the Quartet, was barely visible in 
a gathering of 49 attendees. Yet it was the Quartet which retained formal responsibility for 
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the Roadmap and to that end the EU continued to stake out a ‘supporting role’ in the so-
called ‘Annapolis process.’51 Further, in the run-up to the conference the EU presented an 
Action Strategy on State-building for Peace in the Middle East which reaffirmed obligations 
to fund Palestinian institutions of government, police and customs, as well as ensuring the 
sustainability of PA finances and contributing towards humanitarian relief. An international 
donor conference in Paris in December saw pledges of over 5 billion Euro received on behalf 
of the PA with the EU contributing 2.3 billion for the period 2008-10.52  
 
5. Operation Cast Lead 
The Annapolis process eventually stalled owing to irreconcilable differences between Israel 
and the PA compounded by internal disagreements within both camps.  Neither was 
possessed of the political resources necessary to see through implementation of the initial 
requirements of the Roadmap - respectively, the cessation of Israel settlements in the West 
Bank and the disarming of Palestinian militias (Hamas, in other words). Evaporation of the 
prospects of a settlement coincided with important developments in the US (the election of 
Democratic president, Barack Obama) and the EU (the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty) both 
of which would be important in international efforts on I-P.  
 Obama’s coming to power coincided with a convergence of EU and US positions 
similar to that experienced in the initial aftermath of the Quartet’s formation. Speeches in 
Cairo by, respectively, the US president (in June 2009) and the newly-installed High 
Representative, Catherine Ashton (March 2010) reaffirmed support of a two-state solution 
and opposition to continued Israeli settlements in the West Bank. There were some 
                                                          
51
 Asseburg, supra n.48 at 35.  
52
 O’Donnell, supra n.50.  
21 
 
21 
 
different shades of emphasis – Ashton made clear that ‘a viable State of Palestine’ should be 
based on ‘the 1967 lines’ (that is, those which existed prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), a 
position rejected by Israel and avoided by the US. That distinction, however, was made good 
in a subsequent Obama speech in May 2011 in which the president, to Israel’s great 
consternation, referred to ‘the 1967 lines’ as the preferred basis of the ‘borders of Israel and 
Palestine.’53 
 It would be wrong to suggest this shift was occasioned by EU influence, but it was 
certainly facilitated by a desire on the part of Obama to close some of the sharp trans-
Atlantic disagreements which had opened up under his predecessor (most notably over 
Iraq) while adding credibility to US efforts in the region (on Iran as much as I-P).54 American-
EU convergence was also the result of a common frustration, not simply with the seemingly 
endless task of pursuing an I-P settlement, but increasingly with Israeli intransigence.   
 Operation Cast Lead (the Israeli military assault on the Gaza Strip in December 2008-
January 2009) tested both American and European opinion. The EU, in line with its long-
standing position in favor of Israel’s right to defend itself was initially supportive of the 
operation. Under the Czech Presidency of the European Council, the EU announced that the 
operation was defensive in nature.55 While domestic Czech politics played a role in asserting 
this pro-Israel stance, the EU was quick to revert back to its policy in favor of the 
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Palestinians. In fact, the EU came to roundly condemn the disproportionate use of force by 
Israel and, for good measure, suspended talks on an EU-Israel Action Plan.56 The US position 
moved in a similar direction. The Bush administration among its last acts of foreign policy 
offered tacit support of Israel by blocking a UN Security Council statement calling for a 
cease-fire. By contrast, Obama who took office just as Cast Lead was winding down  
sought, once inaugurated, a diplomatic balance between competing Israel and Palestinian 
positions.57  
  
6. Votes in the UN General Assembly, 2011 and 2012.  
The convergence over Operation Cast Lead foundered subsequently. As in 2004, the arena 
of dispute was the UNGA (although on this occasion the European position was much less 
united). In September 2011, Abbas submitted a letter to the UN Secretary General 
requesting that ‘the State of Palestine’ (i.e. the PA) be admitted as ‘a full member of the 
United Nations.’58 Referred initially to the Admissions Committee of the Security Council, 
the request failed to win sufficient support - the US made clear it would use its veto, while 
the UK and France indicated they would abstain. The matter was then put before the UNGA 
in amended form, the proposal now being to upgrade the observer status Palestine had 
enjoyed since 1974 from ‘non-state’ to ‘state’ (a position similar to that held by the Holy 
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See). In the midst of these moves, a parallel bid for Palestinian membership of UNESCO did 
succeed, amidst a patchwork of European positions (five joined the US in voting against, 
eleven voted in favour, and eleven abstained). That move, however, carried much less 
significance than the UNGA vote.  Scheduled for November 2012, the vote provided an ideal 
opportunity for the EU to assert a common position and collective influence. The US had 
made it clear it would oppose the Palestinian proposal and urged European states to do 
likewise.59 The US position was, however, representative of only a small minority in the 
UNGA as the resolution to upgrade Palestine’s status was passed by a large margin (138 in 
favor to 9 against). Only one EU Member State (the Czech Republic) joined the American 
delegate in voting against the proposal; 14 voted in favour and 12 abstained. It is too severe 
to view this lack of unity as indicative of EU ineffectiveness. True, the EU Member States did 
not vote as a bloc, but the pattern of voting made clear that Europeans would not simply 
submit to American pressure.  
 
7.  Putting Pressure on Israel 
Differences at the UN had not prevented ongoing diplomatic cooperation between the US 
and the EU.  In June 2013 the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, managed to persuade Israel 
and the PA to resume direct peace talks. The subsequent nine months of negotiation proved 
as inconclusive as previous efforts but it was clear nonetheless that the diplomatic process 
had, once again, been framed by the US rather than the Quartet. Meetings of Israeli and 
Palestinian officials were mediated by the US Special Envoy, Martin Indyk, while Kerry 
himself engaged in an intensive shuttle diplomacy at the highest levels of Israeli and 
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Palestinian politics. The basis of the American position was a by now familiar one, centred 
on a two-state solution (involving agreement on pre-1967 borders) and a freezing of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank.60 
 Ashton, on behalf of the EU, offered her support to Kerry’s efforts and in December 
2013 the European Council held out the possibility of ‘special privileged’ partnerships for 
both Israel and the PA if a final settlement could be reached. In this sense, the EU was 
attempting to maintain a balanced position. Despite its record of sympathy toward the 
Palestinians, the EU had just about sustained a cooperative relationship with Israel, 
formalized since 2005 within the Action Plan framework. That relationship, however, had its 
limits. EU hostility to Israeli settlement policy gave rise in July 2013 to the termination of 
European grants to companies and educational bodies associated with settler communities. 
In a further initiative, any Israeli entity seeking to obtain funding or cooperation with the EU 
would henceforth have to show an absence of links to the West Bank, East Jerusalem and 
the Golan Heights. These measures were supplemented by a campaign, rolled out since the 
early 2000s (and already in force in the US), of diplomatic sanction against Israel via labeling 
guidelines (with a variety of exports into the EU from the occupied territories being required 
to avoid a ‘product of Israel’ designation).61  
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8. Operation Protective Edge 
The resumed peace process was condemned to irrelevance shortly after by Operation 
Protective Edge, an Israeli military assault launched in July 2014 in retaliation for Hamas 
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip.  Here, American and European positions were clearly 
distinct. The US did, unusually, criticize Israeli actions but entered into new arms sales 
agreements with Israel even while the Gaza conflict was raging.62 The European position 
was much more forthright. While criticizing Hamas and acknowledging Israel’s right of self 
defence, the EU noted it was ‘appalled by the human cost of the Israeli military operation.’ 
The EU also supported Egypt’s efforts at brokering a ceasefire, offered to contribute to ‘a 
comprehensive and sustainable solution’ to the crisis in Gaza through ‘a reactivation and 
possible extension’ of its two CSDP missions in the region, and made clear it would play a 
major role in post-conflict reconstruction.63  An international donors’ conference held in 
Cairo in September elicited pledges of nearly $5.4billion for the Palestinians (with half ear-
marked for the reconstruction in the Gaza Strip). Turkey and the US were among the largest 
donors, but the combined pledges of the EU bloc were bettered only by Qatar.64  Twelve 
months after the Gaza crisis, its diplomatic repercussions were still being felt. In July 2015, 
all EU Member States present in the UN Human Rights Council approved a Palestinian-
drafted resolution condemning Israel’s Gaza operation and calling upon the Israeli 
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government to cooperate with an International Criminal Court investigation. The US cast the 
sole vote against. 
 These events also shaped European opinion in favour of a Palestinian state. In 
October 2014, Sweden became the first member of the EU to recognize the state of 
Palestine.65 Shortly after parliaments in the UK, Ireland, France, Portugal and Spain called 
upon their governments to do the same. The process was capped in December when the 
European Parliament backed a motion in favor of recognition in principle by 498 votes to 88. 
None of these resolutions was binding and the European Parliament’s resolution was most 
obviously constrained by the fact that recognition is a matter for Member States not the EU.  
That said, two points stand out from this episode. First, pro-Palestinian sentiment 
was clearly at odds with the American position, which continued to regard recognition as 
‘premature.’66 Second, such sentiment was indicative of a growing frustration at the limits of 
the EU’s rhetorical commitment to Palestinian statehood. Despite the aspirations of the 
1999 Berlin Declaration and the intervening history of disagreement with Israel, ‘neither the 
EU nor its member states [had] ever led the process of breaking with the status quo and 
firmly advancing toward recognition.’67 The vote of the European Parliament did not, 
however, change this – indeed, subsequent Council conclusions on I-P stuck determinedly to 
familiar positions on ‘the viability of the two state solution’ (in other words, no support for 
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an independent Palestine outside the ‘multilateral approach to the peace process’).68   
 The consequences of Operation Protective Edge thus provided a mixed message. The 
EU made clear its displeasure at Israeli action, but following this up with decisive diplomatic 
action remained subject to the EU’s internal politics and the exigencies of working within 
established international frameworks.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Operation Protective Edge notwithstanding, our central argument is that the EU has been 
effective in articulating a consistent and clear set of policies on I-P since its entry into the 
Quartet in 2002. The broad parameters of policy have entailed support for a two-state 
solution, acceptance of Israel’s right to defend itself and live peacefully with its neighbors, 
along with promotion of the political and socio-economic integrity of the PA. These 
positions have placed the EU on-side with US-led initiatives including the formation of the 
Quartet and the launch of the Roadmap for Peace, the Annapolis process and the Kerry-led 
diplomatic effort of 2013-2014.  
 Such an alignment is compatible with EU autonomy if we bear in mind four 
considerations. First, the EU cannot mobilize diplomatic action like the US can. We cannot 
criticize the EU for being overly deferential to the US (and, by extension, ineffective) 
because it could not convene the Annapolis conference in 2007 or because it could not push 
the parties back to the negotiating table as Kerry did in 2013. Such diplomatic initiatives 
remain in the gift of the US which is possessed of an influence over Israel which the EU 
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simply lacks. Following the American lead, then, is the means by which the EU is able to avail 
itself of diplomatic opportunities which otherwise would be closed off.  Second, the US has 
not demanded EU involvement on the I-P issue. Rather, the EU has followed the American 
lead through choice. That it has done so, thirdly, is because convergence with the US on I-P 
has been in accord with established EU positions. Some of these, in fact, pre-date US policy. 
While the EU cannot claim to have influenced the US in moving toward the two-state 
solution, it certainly paved the way in making that position more acceptable internationally. 
Fourth, and crucially, convergence on core principles has not prevented the EU (acting as a 
bloc of Member States) pursuing secondary matters at odds with US preferences. On several 
occasions, UN fora have been the site of a distinct difference of opinion in which European 
views matched an international consensus from which the US has departed. Similarly, as 
Operation Cast Lead indicates, the EU has been prepared to offer criticism of Israel that goes 
well beyond American positions. The revival of the recognition issue in 2014, meanwhile is 
indicative of a strain of European opinion which, while not formally set in European 
institutions, reinforces the distinction the EU has fostered over many years that it is the 
international champion of the Palestinian cause.  
 Overall, however, the partnership between the EU and the US has developed in a 
mutually beneficial way. Its institutional format, the Quartet, has faded from prominence 
but the EU has provided credibility to international efforts to address the intractable I-P 
problem as well as making a significant material contribution to the operation of the PA. It is 
interesting to note that these efforts have, in recent years, run in parallel with joint US and 
European efforts on Iran. That issue as well as the challenges of Syria and Iraq have, since 
the collapse of the Kerry initiative in 2014, drawn international attention away from I-P. 
However, on the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the EU and the US remain 
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locked in a relationship of mutual interest. A French initiative to host an international 
conference on I-P in June 2016 was initially delayed in order to accommodate Kerry’s 
schedule. Mogherini, meanwhile, noted that the EU as Israel’s biggest trade partner and the 
PA’s main source of aid held the incentives necessary to entice the conflicting parties back 
to the negotiating table.69  
 This conclusion leads to a final thought relevant to the unfolding of the new EU 
Global Strategy. Timid and divided the EU may well be in many instances, but on I-P the 
ability of the EU to both assert its autonomy and to affirm its credentials as a partner of the 
US suggests that CFSP is not as ineffectual as some would claim. True, the EU has 
demonstrably little leverage over Israel and despite obvious investment in the Palestinian 
cause has been unable to obtain a position of co-equal of the US in negotiations. Yet what is 
equally clear is that where Member State preferences have largely coincided and where the 
instruments of CFSP and the EU more widely (most notably economic and civil assistance) 
have been put in service of a consistent set of policies, then autonomy and effectiveness 
have followed.   
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